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Random Partitioning Forest for Point-Wise and
Collective Anomaly Detection - Application to
Intrusion Detection
Pierre-Francois Marteau
Abstract—In this paper, we propose DiFF-RF, an ensemble
approach composed of random partitioning binary trees to
detect point-wise and collective (as well as contextual) anomalies.
Thanks to a distance-based paradigm used at the leaves of the
trees, this semi-supervised approach solves a drawback that has
been identified in the isolation forest (IF) algorithm. Moreover,
taking into account the frequencies of visits in the leaves of the
random trees allows to significantly improve the performance of
DiFF-RF when considering the presence of collective anomalies.
DiFF-RF is fairly easy to train, and excellent performance can
be obtained by using a simple semi-supervised procedure to
setup the extra hyper-parameter that is introduced. We first
evaluate DiFF-RF on a synthetic data set to i) verify that the
limitation of the IF algorithm is overcome, ii) demonstrate how
collective anomalies are actually detected and iii) to analyze
the effect of the meta-parameters it involves. We assess the
DiFF-RF algorithm on a large set of datasets from the UCI
repository, as well as two benchmarks related to intrusion de-
tection applications. Our experiments show that DiFF-RF almost
systematically outperforms the IF algorithm, but also challenges
the one-class SVM baseline and a deep learning variational auto-
encoder architecture. Furthermore, our experience shows that
DiFF-RF can work well in the presence of small-scale learning
data, which is conversely difficult for deep neural architectures.
Finally, DiFF-RF is computationally efficient and can be easily
parallelized on multi-core architectures.
Index Terms—Random Forest, Machine Learning, Semi-
supervised Learning, Anomaly Detection, Intrusion Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection has been a hot topic for several decades
and has led to numerous applications in a wide range of
domains, such as fault tolerance in industry, crisis detection in
finance and economy, health diagnosis, extreme phenomena
in earth science and meteorology, atypical celestial object
detection in astronomy or astrophysics, system intrusion in
cyber-security, etc.
Anomaly detection is generally defined as the problem of
identifying patterns that deviate from a ’normality’ behavioral
model, namely a model that is fitted from known normal
data only. According to this definition, anomaly detection falls
into the semi-supervised learning framework, a broad machine
learning area in which our work is positioned.
In the literature, most semi-supervised anomaly detection
approaches can be categorized either according to the model
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of normality that is involved or to the way they address the
abnormality characterization and its identification.
A quite exhaustive, although a bit dated, review in anomaly
detection has been proposed in [1], completed by a more recent
comparative study [2]. According to these studies, the state of
the art methods can be distributed into five main categories:
1) Near neighbors and clustering based methods [3]:
Near Neighbors methods rely on the assumption that a
’normal’ instance occurs close to its near neighbors while
an anomaly occurs far from its near neighbors. Similarly,
cluster based methods rely generally on the assumption
that a ’normal’ instance occurs near its closest cluster
centroid while an anomaly will occur far from its nearest
cluster centroid [4], [5]. However, some cluster-based
methods assume that the training data may contain (unla-
beled) anomalies that form their own (small and isolated)
clusters. In that context, many group anomaly detection
methods have been developed, one can mentioned [6] in
the deep learning framework.
2) Classification based method: in this paradigm, several
classes of ’normal’ data are learned by a set of one
against all classifiers (each classifier is associated to a
class and is trained to separate it from the others classes).
An instance that is not categorized as ’normal’ by any of
these classifiers is considered as an anomaly. A peculiar
case occurs when a single class is used to model the
’normal’ data. Random Forest, including recent advances
on one-class random forest [7], multi-class and one-class
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [8], and neural networks
[9], [10], [11], are the most used classifiers for anomaly
detection.
3) Statistical based methods rely on the assumption that
’normal’ data are associated to high probability states
of an underlying stochastic process while anomalies
are associated to low probability states of this process.
Popular approaches in this category are kernel based
density models and the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM),
including recent advance in one-class GMM [12],
4) Information theoretic based methods use information
theoretic measures [13], such as the entropy, the Kol-
mogorof complexity, the minimum description length,
etc, to estimate the ’complexity’ of the ’normal’ dataset
(or equivalently the complexity of the process behind
the production of these data) [14]. If C(D) estimates the
complexity of dataset D, the minimal subset of instance I
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that maximizes C(D)−C(I) is considered as the anomaly
subset.
5) Spectral based method rely on the assumption that it
is possible to embed the data into a lower dimensional
subspace in which ’normal’ data and anomalies are
supposedly well separated [15]. PCA and graph (of simi-
larity) clustering are among the most popular methods in
this category.
We can think of a sixth class of method covering recent
advances in deep learning and self-encoding based methods.
These approaches have been historically initiated by [16]
and adapted recently to a deep learning framework under
the form of auto-encoder (AE) [17] and Variational Auto-
Encoder (VAE) [18]. In the context of anomaly detection,
reconstruction error is the criterion used to decide whether
a data item is normal or deviates too much from normality.
The main advantage of VAE against AE is that their latent
spaces are, by design, continuous, thanks to the prediction of
a mean and a variance vectors allowing to smooth locally the
latent space.
In 2008, Isolation Forest (IF) [19], a quite conceptually dif-
ferent approach to the previously referenced methods, has been
proposed that went strangely below the radar of the previous
review. The IF paradigm is based on the difficulty to isolate
a particular instance inside the whole set of instances when
using (random) tree structures. It relies on the assumption
that an anomaly is in general much easier to isolate than
a ’normal’ data instance. Hence, IF is an unsupervised ap-
proach that relates somehow to the information theoretic based
methods since the isolation difficulty is addressed through
an algorithmic complexity scheme. IF has been successfully
used in some applications, [20], [21] and extended recently
in [22] to improve the selection of attributes and their split
values when constructing the tree. The main advantage of IF
based algorithms is their capability to process large amount of
data in high dimension spaces with computational and spatial
controlled efficiency compared to other unsupervised methods.
Unfortunately, as shown in [23], IF suffers from what we call
”blind spots”, namely empty portions of the space in which
data instances are embedded, that are nevertheless considered
as normality spots by the IF algorithm.
The aim of this paper is to propose, a semi-supervised
ensemble approach based on random partitioning trees that we
refer to as DiFF-RF. Although DiFF-RF is essentially based on
a random forest structure, just as IF, it differs fundamentally
on the way anomalies are characterized. The use of a distance
based criteria allows to solve the ’blind spots’ mis-detection
of IF. Moreover, taking into account the relative frequency
of visit at the leaves of the trees provides a complementary
discriminant information that improves greatly the detection
when facing collective anomalies.
We detail the DiFF-RF algorithm in the second section
of this paper by first introducing the distance-based and the
relative frequency of visit paradigms at leaf level. We then
provide some highlights about the the way the so-called ’blind
spot’ mis-detections of the IF algorithm are effectively solved
by using a synthetic dataset. On these data we carried out
a hyper-parameter sensibility study to estimate satisfactory
ranges for default values (number of trees and sample size)
and present a simple semi-supervised procedure to setup the
extra parameter (distance scaling) introduced in DiFF-RF. The
third section addresses an extensive experimentation using
UCI datasets from various domains and finally highlights an
application in intrusion detection by exploiting two public do-
main benchmarks. This experimentation assesses the benefits
brought by the DiFF-RF algorithm in point-wise and collective
anomaly detection. Our results show that the proposed DiFF-
RF algorithm compares advantageously with the state of the
art baselines in anomaly detection that we have considered,
namely one-class SVM and deep variational auto-encoder. A
general discussion and some perspectives conclude the article.
II. THE DIFF-RF ALGORITHM
Just as the IF algorithm, DiFF-RF is nothing but a forest
of binary partitioning trees. But, contrarily to the IF that uses
the expected length of the path required to locate a data as
the anomaly score (an ’outlier’ is expected to have a shorter
path than an ’inlier’), DiFF-RF uses an expected distance
measure to the centroid associated to the leaves of the trees to
decide wether the tested data is a point-wise anomaly or not.
A relative frequency of visit principle is also implemented at
leaf level leading to a scoring that is aggregated to the distance
score when collective anomalies are considered.
1) Building the DiFF-RF forest: Let Xn ⊂ Rd be the set
of training (normal) instances. The DiFF-RF algorithm is an
ensemble based approach that builds a forest of random binary
partitioning trees. Given a sample S randomly drawn from Xn,
a DiFF tree T(S) is recursively built according to the (DiFF-
Tree) algorithm 1.
Two meta-parameters are required to build a DiFF-RF: ψ,
the size of the subsets S that are used to build the trees, and
t, the number of trees. Parameter hmax , the maximum height
of the trees, is empirically set up to dlog2ψe.
Finally, the DiFF forest F = {T(S1),T(S2), · · · ,T(St )} is
obtained by randomly selecting {S1, S2, · · · , St }, t samples in
Xn with |Si | = ψ for all i, and constructing a DiFF-Tree on
each of these samples, as depicted in Algorithm 1.
The partitioning algorithm used in DiFF-FR differs from
that used by IF, in the way cutting dimensions are selected.
The selection is obtained through the use of an empirical
probability distribution D. Its justification is based on the
following remark.
Dimensions with very high entropy can be assimilated to
noise and therefore structurally less exploitable to partition
an instance set. Hence, in DiFF-FR, we favor dimensions
associated to low to medium entropy. To that end, we estimate
empirically on the subset Sn associated to the node to be
split, the entropy Hq of each dimension q. After applying the
normalizing function (1−Hq/log2(#bins)), where #bins is the
number of bins in the histograms, we obtain the probability
of selecting a dimension, as depicted in Algorithm 2. For all
our experimentation, empirically, we fixed #bins = 10.
Basically, for each dimension an histogram is evaluated
based on the instances in S. The empirical normalized entropy
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Algorithm 1 Function DiFF-Tree(S, h, hmax)
Require: S ⊂ Xn, l the current depth level, hmax the maximal
depth limit
Ensure: an DiFF-Tree
1: if h ≥ hmax or |S | ≤ 1 then
2: fr = |S |/ψ
3: if |S | ≥ 0 then
4: MS ← Mean(S);
5: σS ← StandardDeviation(S);
6: else
7: MS ← None
8: σS ← None
9: end if
10: return leafNode(S, MS , σS , fr )
11: else
12: D← get qDistribution(S)
13: Randomly select a dimension q ∈ {1, · · · , d} according
to distribution D
14: Randomly select a split value p between max and min
values along dimension q in S
15: Sl ← filter(S, q < p)
16: Sr ← filter(S, q ≥ p)
17: return inNode(Left ← DiFF-Tree(Sl, h + 1, hmax),
Right ← DiFF-Tree(Sr, h + 1, hmax),
splitAtt ← q,
splitVal ← p);
18: end if
Algorithm 2 Function get qDistribution(S): EEi is the em-
pirical normalized entropy of dimension i evaluated using
an histogram with #bins = 10. U stands for the uniform
distribution.
Require: S ⊂ Xn
Ensure: D, a probability distribution over the feature space
dimensions {1, · · · , d}
1: if |S | ≤ 10 then
2: return U[1/d]i∈{1, · · ·d}
3: else
4: D← [1 − EEi]i∈{1, · · ·d} (EEi is defined in Eq. 1)
5: return D/∑di=1(Di)
6: end if
given in Eq. 1 is then computed on the bins of this histogram,
and finally normalized by the maximum entropy (log2(#bins)).
∀i ∈ {1, · · · d},
EEi =
−1
log2(#bins)
#bins∑
k=1
bk/|S | · log2(bk/|S |) (1)
2) Constructing the anomaly scores: the anomaly score
for DiFF-RF is constructed from the analysis of search results
in the set of DiFF trees. Two cases are considered, depending
on whether one is dealing with a point-wise anomaly or
collective anomalies.
Score for point-wise anomaly detection: for a given tree T ,
and a given point-wise data x falling in a leaf e of T associated
to subset of instances S, the anomaly score is defined from the
weighted distance δ(MS, σS, x):
δ(MS, σS, x) = 1d
d∑
i=1
( x(i) − MS(i)
σS
)2
(2)
where MS and σS are respectively the centroid and standard
deviation of the training instances attached to the leaf in which
x falls. For tree T , the anomaly score is evaluated as
δT (x) = 2−α ·δ(MS,σS,x) (3)
The point-wise anomaly score, pwas, is then defined as:
pwas(x) = −E(δT (x)) (4)
where E is the mathematical expectation taken over the col-
lection of DiFF trees in the forest, and α is the single extra
hyper-parameter used to scale the distance calculations.
Hence, when the expectation of the distances between x and
the leaf centroids tends toward 0, the anomaly score pwas(x)
takes its minimal value, −1, while, when the expectation of
these distances tends toward infinity, the score pwas(x) takes
its maximal value, 0.
Algorithm 3 presents the recursive evaluation of δT (x)
given x, a DiFF tree, T .
Algorithm 3 Function δT (x)
Require: x an instance, T a DiFF tree
Ensure: δT (x,T, 0), the point-wise anomaly score for x pro-
vided by T
1: if T is a leaf node associated to substet of instances S
then
2: return 2−α ·δ(MS,σS,x)
3: end if
4: a← T .splitAtt;
5: if x[a] < T .splitValue then
6: return δT (x,T .le f t);
7: else
8: return δT (x,T .right);
9: end if
Score for collective anomaly detection: as defined in [1],
collective anomalies occur when a subset of related data
instances is abnormal relatively to the training data set. Notice
that collective anomalies can be composed with point-wise
normal instances. It is then the abnormal co-occurrences
of these instances that characterize the collective anomaly.
DiFF-RF considers the visiting frequencies in the leaf nodes
as the basic element for constructing a collective anomaly
score. When constructing the trees, the estimated frequency
of visit in a leaf node e is evaluated as the ratio fn = |S |/ψ
between the number of instances attached to the leaf e, |S |,
and the total number of training instances used to build the
tree, namely ψ. This is depicted at line 2 of Algorithm 1.
At test time, when a subset X ⊂ Rd of instances, potentially
containing some collective anomalies, a new frequency of visit
is evaluated at each leaf e as fX = |SX |/|X |, where SX is the
subset of elements of X that fall in leaf e.
DRAFT PAPER OF LATEX CLASS FILES, JUNE 2020 4
For each leaf e of each tree T in the forest, we can thus
evaluate the relative train/test visit frequencies at leaf levels as
the ratio νT (X) = fn/ fX . For tree T , the collective anomaly for
instance x ∈ X is calculated as the aggregation of the distance
score and the relative frequency score: cT (x, X) = δT (x)·νT (X)
Finally, the collective anomaly score given the context X is:
cas(x, X) = −E(cT (x, X)) (5)
where x ∈ X and E is the mathematical expectation taken over
the trees T in the forest.
Hence, when the ratio of visit frequencies tends towards 0,
i.e. when the leaves are much more visited during test time,
then the score cas(x, X) tends to its maximum, 0, which will
characterized the presence of collective anomalies.
Algorithm 4 presents the recursive evaluation of
cT (x, X) = δT (x) · νT (x, X) given x, X , and a DiFF
tree, T , the current path length, h being initialized with 0.
Algorithm 4 Function νT (x, X)
Require: X a subset of test instances, T an DiFF tree
Ensure: νT (x, X,T, 0), the collective anomaly score for all x ∈
X
1: if T is a leaf node associated to substet of instances S
then
2: return ∀x ∈ X , 2−α ·δ(MS,σS,x) · fn/ fX
3: end if
4: a← T .splitAtt;
5: if x[a] < T .splitVal then
6: return νT (x, X,T .le f t);
7: else
8: return νT (x, X,T .right);
9: end if
A. ’Blind spots’ in IF do not exist in DiFF-RF
The assumption behind the IF algorithm is that anomalies
will be associated to short paths in the partitioning trees,
leading to a high anomaly score, while ’normal’ data will be
associated to longer paths, leading to a low anomaly score.
Unfortunately, if this is true for normally distributed data
for instance, this is not true in general. In particular, this
assumption is not verified for data distributed in a concave set
such as a torus or a set with a ’horse shoe’ shape. This ’blind
spot’ effect is greatly reduced in the DiFF-RF because of the
distance criteria to the centroid evaluated at the leaf nodes. To
demonstrate this, we develop the following experiment based
on synthetic data.
1) Synthetic experiment: in this setting, ’normal’ data be-
longs to a 2D-torus centered in (0, 0) and delimited by two
concentric circles whose radius are respectively 1.5 and 4.
A training (Xn) and a testing (Xnt ) sets of normal data are
uniformly drawn from this 2D-torus, each one containing
n = 1000 instances, as depicted in Fig. 1.
A first ’anomaly’ set (Xr ) is drawn from a Normal distri-
bution with mean (3., 3.) and covariance ((.25, 0), (0, .25)), as
depicted in red square dots at the top right side of Fig. 1.
These anomalies intersect the 2D-torus at its top right side.
A second ’anomaly’ set (Xg) is drawn from a Normal
distribution with mean (0., 0.) and covariance ((.5, 0), (0, .5)),
as depicted in green diamond dots located in the center of the
2D-torus in Fig. 1.
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Fig. 1. 2D-torus ’normal’ data set in blue round dots, with a cluster of
anomaly data in red square dots at the top right side of the torus, with an
additional cluster of anomaly data in green diamond dots at the center of the
torus.
Then we build the IF and the DiFF-RF (with a sample size
ψ = 512 and t = 128 trees) from the ’normal’ dataset Xn
and evaluate the distributions of the anomaly scores obtained
for the ’normal’ ’blue’ test dataset Xnt , the ’red’ anomalies
Xr and the ’green’ anomalies Xg. In Fig.2, the left column
presents for the IF algorithm the ’normal’ v.s. ’red’ anomalies
(a) distributions, and with the addition of the green anomaly
distribution (c).
At this point, we clearly show that for IF the ’green’
anomaly distribution is in large intersection with the ’normal’
data distribution, which is not the case for the ’red’ anomaly
distribution. Hence anomalies located at the center of the
torus are likely to be much more mis-detected by the IF
algorithm than anomalies located at the periphery of the torus.
Similarly, 2nd to 4th columns of Fig.2 present the DiFF-RF
algorithm scores for the ’normal’ v.s. ’red’ anomalies (top)
distributions, and with the addition of the green anomaly
distribution (bottom). The 2nd column corresponds to the
point-wise anomaly scores, the 3rd column corresponds to
the expectation of the ratio of visiting frequencies at the
leaf nodes (νT (X)) and the right column corresponds to the
collective anomaly scores.
We can see that, thanks to the distance-based measure, the
point-wise anomaly score is able to discriminate the green
anomaly as well as the red ones, although not perfectly since
the distributions still overlap. The frequency of visits seems to
reasonably discriminate the red anomaly but also suffers from
a blind spot effect. However, the aggregation of the distance
score with the frequency score is particularly discriminating
for both types of anomalies (red and green). This shows a
great complementarity of these two scores in the context of
collective anomaly detection.
DRAFT PAPER OF LATEX CLASS FILES, JUNE 2020 5
(a)
0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
(b)
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7
0
10
20
30
40
(c)
0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00
0
20
40
60
80
100
(d)
3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
(e)
0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
(f)
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7
0
10
20
30
40
(g)
0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00
0
20
40
60
80
100
(h)
3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Fig. 2. Distributions of the anomaly scores for the ’normal’ data, in blue, for the ’red’ anomalies (top row), and with the insertion of ’green’ anomalies
(bottom row). IF (a, e), DiFF-RF point-wise (b, f), DiFF-RF frequency of visit only (c, g) and DiFF-RF collective (d, h).
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Fig. 3. 2D-torus heat map corresponding to the IF (a), to the point-wise anomaly score of the DiFF-RF (b), to the expectation of the ratio of visiting
frequencies in the DiFF-RF (c), to the collective anomaly score of the DiFF-RF (d).
Fig. 3 provides the heat maps evaluated for the IF score (3-
a), and the DiFF-RF scores (point-wise anomaly score (3-b),
expectation of the ratio of visiting frequencies in the DiFF-
RF (3-c) and to the DiFF-RF collective anomaly aggregated
score (d)). We clearly visualize the blind spot effect for the IF
(3-a), and not for the point-wise anomaly score of the DiFF-
RF (3-b). The heat map corresponding to the ratio of visiting
frequencies is quite interesting: the hottest points (yellow/light)
are located at the limits of the torus and on the anomaly
clusters whose instances are likely to fall in leaves which
are associated to training instances precisely located at the
limits of the torus. The product of these two complementary
scores provides obviously a very discriminating score, able to
separate neatly on this experiment the two types of anomalies
from normal data, as shown in sub-figure (3-d).
To complete these results, Fig.4 gives the Receiver
Operating Curve (ROC) and Area Under the Curve (AUC)
values for the tested detectors trained on ’normal’ data only
and tested on a disjoint set of normal data concatenated with
the red and green anomalies subsets. For IF, due to the blind
spot mis-detection, AUC is only 0.73 while it reaches .95
for DiFF-RF point-wise detection and .98 for the DiFF-RF
collective anomaly score. For completeness, the AUC for the
expected ratio of visiting frequency scoring is .73, indicating
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
False Positive Rate
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Tr
ue
 P
os
iti
ve
 R
at
e
IF (auc = 0.73)
Di-RF (auc = 0.95)
FF-RF (auc = 0.73)
DiFF_RF (auc = 0.98)
Fig. 4. ROC curves and AUC for IF (dashed line), DiFF-RF point-wise
anomaly (Di-RF, dashdot line), DiFF-RF ratio of visiting frequency (FF-
RF, dotted line), DiFF-RF collective anomaly (solid line): ’normal’ test data
against all anomalies (red and green).
its discriminative complementarity with the distance-based
score. These results are fully in accordance with our previous
observations.
2) Dependence to the sample size (psi) in each tree and
to the number of trees (t) in the forest: the dependence of
the AUC assessment measure to the hyper-parameter settings,
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namely the number of DiFF trees t, and the sample size ψ
assigned to each DiFF tree, are presented respectively in in
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
8 16 32 64 128 256 512 102
4
#trees (t)
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
AU
C
IF
Di_RF
FF_RF
DiFF_RF
Fig. 5. AUC values when the number of trees varies while the sample size
remains constant equal to 128 instances and α = 10.
5 10 50 100 250 500 750 900 100
0
sample size ( (%))
0.4
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IF
Di_RF
FF_RF
DiFF_RF
Fig. 6. AUC values when the sample size varies while the number of trees
in the forest remains constant equal to 128 trees and α = 10.
For this experiment, a dataset size of n = 2000 ’normal’
samples is used to train the isolation forest, and α = 10 is
maintained constant. One can see that the DiFF-RF in its
point-wise detection configuration (Di-RF) reaches good and
relatively stable AUC values with few trees (Fig. 5), from
128 to 1024 trees, and low sample sizes (Fig. 6), from 250
to 1000 samples, which is quite advantageous in terms of
memory space and response time. In its collective anomaly
configuration (DiFF-RF), the performance are surprisingly
high and almost constant whatever these two hyper-parameters
are respectively above 32 trees and 100 instances.
B. Setting up scaling meta parameters alpha
Figures 7 presents the AUC values as α varies in [10−3; 103].
Basically, α is mainly used to ensure that the term δT (Eq.
3) remains computable under the experimental conditions
encountered. The figure shows that, on this experiment, until α
is not too high (below 100), δT is computable hence suitable.
However, the figure shows that ’optimal’ values may exists
due to the non linearity of the exponential function. Hence this
parameter may need some tuning to adapt to the application
data (dimensionality of the problem and scale of the features).
To tune and select the α parameter, we adopt a straightfor-
ward semi-supervised cross-selection procedure depicted in
1.0
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C
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Di_RF
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DiFF_RF
Fig. 7. AUC values when the α hyper-parameter value varies while the
number of trees in the forest and the sample size remain constant equal to
128 trees and 256 instances respectively.
Algorithm 5. This procedure partitions training normal data
into pairs of train/test sets, then evaluates the anomaly scores
obtained on the train and test data and finally calculates a
distance measure, δQ, between the distributions of anomaly
scores obtained, while considering only the highest scores, in
order to focus on the boundary of ”normality” as assumed
by the method. δQ that is used at line 10 of Algorithm 5 is
defined as follows
δQ(P1, P2) =
99∑
i=95
| |Sqi | − (100 − i)| (6)
where |Sqi | is the cardinal of the set of the instances of
P1 whose scores are above the score of the ith quantile of
instances in P2.
The α value that minimizes δQ is the one that is used during
the testing phase.
This procedure applied on the previous synthetic data selects
α = 10, as shown in Fig. 8.
1.0e
-12
1.0e
-09
1.0e
-06
1.0e
-04
1.0e
-03
1.0e
-02
5.0e
-02
1.0e
-01
5.0e
-01
1.0e
+00
2.0e
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2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
lo
g(
(
))
Fig. 8. δQ as a function of α. This curve has been obtained after 12 iterations
on the Donnuts synthetic data set using t = 256 and ψ = 256.
Figure 9 shows that the empirical convergence of the
proposed cross-selection procedure is roughly O(1/n) on the
synthetic data. In practice we have observed similar conver-
gence on all tested datasets. A theoretical statistical analysis
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Algorithm 5 Function get alpha(X, t, ψ)
Require: X a subset of ’normal’ instances, t the number of
trees, ψ the sample size, #iter the number of iterations.
Ensure: α, the hyper-parameter defined in Eq. 3
1: Sα ← [1e-12, 1e-9, 1e-6, 1e-4,1e-3, 1e-2, .05, .1, .5, 1, 2,
5, 10, 100];
2: ∀α ∈ Sα, R(α) = 0 ;
3: for k = 0 to #iter do
4: X ← shu f f le(X);
P← Partition(X, ψ) // Partition X in elements of size
almost equal to ψ;
5: for i = 0 to |P | do
6: for α ∈ do
7: Build a DiFF-RF, f , using Xi = ∪j,iPj , t, ψ, α;
8: Evaluate the piece-wise anomaly scores on Pi
(pwas(Pi));
9: Evaluate the piece-wise anomaly scores on Pi
(pwas(Xi));
10: R(α) ← R(α) + δQ(pwas(Pi), pwas(Xi));
11: end for
12: end for
13: end for
14: ∀α ∈ Sα, R(α) = R(α)/#iter //(see Eq.6);
15: return argminαR;
could determine the conditions for the existence of an upper
bound.
0 1 2 3 4
5
4
3
2
log of R( ) step differences
LR (slope:-0.72)
Fig. 9. R(α) step difference as a function of the iteration k in logarithmic
scale. In dotted line, the linear regression of the curve.
As a conclusion, this experiment tells us that (t = 128,
ψ = .25 · |Xn|) could be considered as a reasonable setting for
small to medium size datasets. We adopt this configuration
as the default setting for the DiFF-RF algorithm. α needs to
be ’optimized’ to best fit the data specificity. The procedure
described in Algorithm 5 can be used efficiently to achieve
this goal as experimentally shown in the experimental section
(Sec. III)
C. Complexity of the DiFF-RF algorithm
Basically, the DiFF-RF algorithm has the same overall
complexity than the IF algorithm, although some extra compu-
tational costs are involved during training and testing stages.
IF has time complexities of O(t · ψ · log(ψ)) in the training
stage and O(n · t · log(ψ)) in the testing stage.
In addition, at training stage, the DiFF-RF algorithm re-
quires to evaluate the centroids of the data attached to each
of the leaf nodes, hence ψ centroids in average need to be
evaluated. The evaluation of a centroid is dependent on the
number of elements contained in the leaf buckets (neb). It
seems difficult to estimate precisely the expectation of neb ,
nevertheless, Fig.10 presents the result of an empirical study
that shows that if the maximal height of the DiFF tree is
hmax = dlog2(ψ)e, then the average neb value increases
slightly faster than a logarithmic law. For this test, the random
forest has been built from a normally distributed dataset with
(0.0, 0.0) mean, and ((3, 0), (0, 3)) covariance matrix. Hence, to
maintain the overall algorithmic complexity at training stage
close to O(ln(ψ)) one may increase slightly the maximal
height of the DiFF tree. One can use for instance hmax =
d1.2 · log2(ψ)e that empirically maintains a sub-logarithmic
growth as shown in Fig.10. At test time, the complexity of
DiFF-RF is still O(n ·t · log(ψ)) with a slight constant overhead
compared to IF, due to the computation of the distances to leaf
centroids.
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Fig. 10. Average number of instances contained in the external nodes of the
iTrees as a function of log2(ψ); when the maximal height of the iTrees is
lmax = dlog2(ψ)e (dotted line), lmax = d1.1 · log2(ψ)e (circle markers)
and lmax = d1.2 · log2(ψ)e (square markers).
III. EXPERIMENTATION
We present below the results of the study we have carried
out on some of the UCI’s machine learning repository, supple-
mented by a study focusing on two intrusion detection bench-
marks. We first describe the semi-supervised methods that we
have used in this comparative study, the datasets exploited to
conduct our experiments, the pre-processing procedure of data
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when specific, prior to present and discuss about the results
that were obtained.
A. Evaluated anomaly detection models
For this study, 5 semi-supervised models have been eval-
uated, basically a one-class SVM classifier (1C-SVM), a
deep variational auto-encoder (VAE), the isolation forest IF
algorithm and the DiFF-RF in its two modes, point-wise and
collective anomaly detections.
For IF and DiFF-RF, the forests comprise 128 trees and
each tree is associated to a data sample containing 25% of
the training instances (with a maximum number set to 50k
instances).
We have used for IF and SVM the implementations provided
by the SKLearn Python toolkit, and tensorflow with Keras for
the VAE implementation. The VAE architecture is composed
of symmetric encoder and decoder architectures implementing
6 dense layers and 3 drop-out layers. The latent space dimen-
sion has been setup to 10% of the dimension of the original
problem with a minimum of 3 dimensions. The VAE has been
trained using the Adam optimizer.
For the one class SVM, the default hyper-parameter values
have been selected which is far to be optimal, but unfortunately
none semi-supervised procedure is defined to tune the two
hyper-parameters ν and γ that are involved.
For DiFF-RF, the hyper-parameter α has been tuned on the
training data according to the semi-supervised cross-selection
procedure defined in subsection II-B.
B. Heterogeneous domain datasets
To assess the DiFF-RF algorithm in various domain area, we
have selected 13 datasets in the UCI repository [24] according
to the following criteria: suitability for binary classification,
multivariate numerical data and variability of the nature of the
data (number of features, number of instances, distinct fields
of application). A brief description of these datasets is given
below.
1) Banknote authentication (BNA): contains 1372 instances
described through 5 features. The task consists to decide
if a vectorized (real) representation of a banknote is legit-
imate or forgery. For our test, forgery data is considered
as anomaly.
2) Cardiotocography Data Set (CTG): contains 2126 in-
stances described through 23 features. If the fetal state
class code is normal (N), then the instance is considered
as ’normal’, otherwise it is considerd as an anomaly.
3) Default of credit card clients (DCCC): contains 30000
instances described through 24 features. The task con-
sists in predicting whether a credit card client will face
payment default in the future. For our test, default data
is considered as anomaly.
4) HTRU2 [25]: contains 17898 instances described through
9 features. Each vector describes a sample of pulsar
candidates collected during the High Time Resolution
Universe Survey. For our test, the legitimate pulsar ex-
amples that belongs to the minority positive class, are
considered as anomalies, and spurious examples, the
majority negative class, are considered as normal data.
5) MAGIC Gamma Telescope Data (MAGIC): contains
19020 instances described through 11 features that char-
acterize either primary gammas (majority class) signal or
hadronic signal (minority class), considered for our test
as anomaly.
6) MiniBooNE particle identification (MiniBooNE): con-
tains 130065 instances described through 50 features
characterizing background signals, considered as the
normal class, and the event signals, considered as the
anomaly.
7) MUSK (version 2): contains 6598 instances related to
molecule conformations described through 168 features.
Musk labeled conformations are considered as anomalies.
8) Occupancy Detection (Occupancy) [26]: contains 20560
instances described through 7 features that characterize
the absence (normal) or presence (anomaly) of an indi-
vidual in a room.
9) Sensorless Drive Diagnosis Data Set (SDD): contains
58509 instances decribed through 49 attributes. Cate-
gories 1-9 are considered as ’normal’ while categories
10-11 are considered as ’abnormal’.
10) Spambase (SPAM): contains 4601 and 17720 instances
described through 57 features. The task is to classify a
vectorized (real) representation of a mail into normal or
spam categories. For our test, spam data are considered
as anomalies.
11) Steel Plates Faults Data Set (SPF) [27]: contains 1941
instances with 27 attributes. Anomalies correspond to the
presence of (at least) one of the 7 fault categories.
12) TV News commercial detection [28], TVCD-BBC and
TVCD-CNN: contain respectively 22535 and 22545 in-
stances described through 4125 features. The task consists
in detecting commercial spots in tv news: commercial
spots are considered here as anomalies.
In addition, we have created a Donnuts dataset (DONNUTS-
2.5) in a 5 dimensions space in which 2 dimensions represent
the torus as defined in section II-A1, and 3 dimensions are
N(0, .2) Gaussian noises.
C. Intrusion detection datasets
The initial motivation for this experiment is the detection
of intrusion into networking systems, which requires consid-
eration of the network’s packet data. While packet headers
generally constitute only a small part of whole network traffic
data, packet payloads are more complicated to model. Con-
sidering a suitable pre-processing process of network traffic
data is quite important since it highly conditions the quality
of anomaly detection.
1) The ISCX dataset: The ISCX dataset 2012 [29] has been
prepared at the Information Security Centre of Excellence at
the University of New Brunswick. The entire ISCX labeled
dataset comprises over two million traffic packets character-
ized with 20 features taking nominal, integer or float values.
The dataset covers roughly seven days of network activities
(i.e. normal and attack). From this dataset, we have extracted
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8 tasks according to the observed application protocol layer
”HTTPWeb”, ”HTTPImageTransfer”, ”POP”, ”DNS”, ”SSH”,
”FTP”, ”SMTP”, ”ICMP”. Four different attack types, called
as Brute Force SSH, Infiltrating, HTTP DoS, and DDoS are
conducted on different days. 80% of the normal data has been
used as training, the remaining normal and attack data has
been used as testing.
2) The UNSW dataset: The UNSW-NB15 dataset 2015 [30]
has been prepared at School of Engineering and IT, UNSW
Canberra at ADFA, University of New South Wales. The
entire UNSW-NB15 labeled dataset comprises two million
and 540,044 records which are stored in the four CSV files.
Each record is described through 49 features taking nominal,
integer or float values. From these files, we have extracted
6 tasks according to the application protocol layer ”HTTP”,
”FTP”, ”SMTP”, ”SSH”, ”DNS”, ”FTP-DATA”. This data
set contains nine types of attacks, namely, Fuzzers, Analysis,
Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shell-
code and Worms. 80% of the normal data has been used as
training, the remaining normal and attack data has been used
as testing.
3) Pre-processing of the ISCX and UNSW data: Data pre-
processing is a crucial task which can be even considered
as a fundamental building block of intrusion detection. Pre-
processing involves cleaning the data and removing redun-
dant and unnecessary entries. It also involves converting the
features of the dataset into numerical data and saving in
a machine-readable format. To convert categorical features
into entirely numerical ones, we adopt the binary number
representation where we use m binary numbers to represent a
m-category feature. However, when a categorical feature takes
its values in an infinite set of categories, we need to consider
another conversion approach. To do so, we use histogram of
distributions.
We end up with 50 numerical features for encoding the
ISCX records and 49 for encoding the UNSW records as
presented in Tab. I and Tab. II respectively.
Last step, but certainly not the least, is to normalize the
data. This step is crucial when dealing with features of
different units and scales. Without normalization, features
with extremely greater values dominate the features with
smaller values. Here we use min-max normalization approach
according to which we fit all the features into the unit interval
[0; 1].
D. Evaluation protocol
For all the methods and datasets, we consider the Area
Under the ROC curve (AUC) and the Average Precision (AP)
as the evaluation measures. This avoids the need to set a
threshold on the scoring values provided by the classifiers.
For all tasks, 80% of randomly selected normal data is used
as training data, while the remaining 20% is used for testing.
E. Results and discussion
We compare in Table III the AUC and AP values obtained
by the 5 benchmarked algorithms (1C-SVM, VAE, IF, DiFF-
RF (point-wise) and DiFF-RF (collective)), on the 13 tested
TABLE I
FEATURE FOR THE ISCX DATA: 10 BINS HISTOGRAM ARE USED TO
ENCODE THE PAYLOADS, AND ONE-HOT-VECTORS TO ENCODE FLAGS.
# of feature feature name # of feature feature name
1 dest Payload0 26 protocol Name4
2 dest Payload1 27 protocol Name5
3 dest Payload2 28 source Payload0
4 dest Payload3 29 source Payload1
5 dest Payload4 30 source Payload2
6 dest Payload5 31 source Payload3
7 dest Payload6 32 source Payload4
8 dest Payload7 33 source Payload5
9 dest Payload8 34 source Payload6
10 dest Payload9 35 source Payload7
11 dest Port 36 source Payload8
12 dest TCPFlag0 37 source Payload9
13 dest TCPFlag1 38 source Port
14 dest TCPFlag2 39 source TCPFlag0
15 dest TCPFlag3 40 source TCPFlag1
16 dest TCPFlag4 41 source TCPFlag2
17 dest TCPFlag5 42 source TCPFlag3
18 direction0 43 source TCPFlag4
19 direction1 44 source TCPFlag5
20 direction2 45 duration
21 direction3 46 total dest Bytes
22 protocol Name0 47 total dest Packets
23 protocol Name1 48 total source Bytes
24 protocol Name2 49 total source Packets
25 protocol Name3 50 # of pairs IP
TABLE II
FEATURE FOR THE UNSW DATA. 1HT MEANS ONE-HOT-VECTOR. FOR
MORE DETAILS ON THE FEATURES, PLEASE CONSULT
HTTPS://RESEARCHDATA.ANDS.ORG.AU/UNSW- NB15- DATASET/1425943
# of feature feature name # of feature feature name
1-2 proto (1HT) 36 res bdy len
3-17 state (1HT) 37 Sjit
18 dur 38 Djit
19 sbytes 39 Sintpkt
20 dbytes 40 Dintpkt
21 sttl 41 tcprtt
22 dttl 42 synack
23 sloss 43 ackdat
24 dloss 44 is sm ips ports
25 Sload 45 ct state ttl
26 Dload 46 ct flw http mthd
27 Spkts 47 is ftp login
28 Dpkts 48 ct ftp cmd
29 swin 49 ct srv src
30 dwin 50 ct srv dst
31 stcpb 51 ct dst ltm
32 dtcpb 52 ct src ltm
33 smeansz 53 ct src dport ltm
34 dmeansz 54 ct dst sport ltm
35 trans depth 55 ct dst src ltm
UCI datasets, the donnut synthetic data and various ISCX and
UNSW application layer data.
The last row in Table III gives the average rank for each
method. If DiFF-RF in its two configurations is the best
ranked methods (closest to the first average rank ideal). Thus,
according to the AUC measure, collective DiFF-RF is rankes
1.31, point-wise DiFF-RF 2.33, VAE 3.03, IF 3.5 and 1C-
SVM 4.39. This overall result can give an over optimistic view
of the situation, as, for some datasets, AUC or AP differences
may not be always significant.
Nevertheless, examining more in detail the classification
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TABLE III
AUC VALUES FOR THE TESTED APPLICATION LAYERS AND THE TESTED METHODS. #TRAIN, #TEST STAND RESPECTIVELY FOR THE NUMBER OF TRAIN,
TEST DATA. (#ABNORMAL) IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ANOMALIES IN THE DATASET.
Dataset 1C-SVM VAE IF DiFF-RF (point-wise) DiFF-RF (collective) α #train/#test (#abnormal)
AUC | AP AUC | AP AUC | AP AUC | AP AUC | AP
DONNUTS-2.5 0.710 | 0.763 0.651 | 0.818 0.679 | 0.817 0.968 | 0.982 0.986 | 0.990 20 2k/2.5k (1.5k)
BNA 0.963 | 0.988 0.8176 | 0.945 0.917 | 0.975 1.0 | 1.0 1.0 | 1.0 2 609/763 (610)
CTG 0.858 | 0.882 0.853 | 0.894 0.809 | 0.852 0.841 | 0.878 0.797 | 0.898 0.1 1324/802 (471)
DCCC 0.475 | 0.555 0.550 | 0.627 0.559 | 0.642 0.612 | 0.680 0.717 | 0.7600 0.05 18K/11k (6.5k)
HTRU2 0.8256 | 0.582 0.944 | 0.934 0.953 | 0.943 0.954 | 0.941 0.952 | 0.952 0.01 13K/5k (1.5k)
MAGIC 0.684 | 0.867 0.705 | 0.872 0.806 | 0.918 0.810 | 0.928 0.901 | 0.950 0.05 10K/9k (6k)
MiniBooNE 0.790 | 0.880 0.820 | 0.886 0.736 | 0.815 0.742 |0.836 0.938 | 0.938 0.05 75K/55k (36k)
MUSK 0.213 | 0.328 0.267 | 0.347 0.362 | 0.387 0.569 | 0.601 0.280 | 0.553 0.5 4.5k/2k (1k)
Occupancy 0.978 | 0.973 0.996 | 0.997 0.985 | 0.986 0.993 | 0.995 0.992 | 0.998 0.1 12.6K/7.9k (4.7k)
SDD 0.501 | 0.537 0.854 | 0.872 0.822 | 0.840 0.791 | 0.816 0.885 | 0.855 0.05 38k/20k (10.5k)
SPAM 0.642 | 0.883 0.801 | 0.900 0.859 | 0.954 0.879 | 0.932 0.903 | 0.937 0.1 2.2k/2.3k (1.8k)
SPF 0.458 | 0.684 0.439 | 0.740 0.415 | 0.710 0.498 | 0.732 0.409 | 0.695 0.01 1k/1k (673)
TVCD-BBC 0.358 | 0.763 0.659 | 0.900 0.724 | .0906 0.72 |0.921 0.758 | 0.961 1 7.4k/10.2k (8.2k)
TVCD-CNN 0.553 | 0.911 0.561 | 0.903 0.526 | 0.897 0.522 | 0.901 0.875 | 0.952 0.001 6.5k/16k (14.4k)
HTTPWeb (ISCX) 0.927 | 0.944 0.932 | 0.946 0.860 | 0.917 0.933 | 0.963 0.996 | 0.998 0.01 40k/50k (40k)
HTTPIT (ISCX) 0.595 |0.010 0.567 | 0.011 0.547 | 0.008 0.610 | 0.015 0.429 | 0.02 1.00E-04 40k/10k (64)
POP (ISCX) 0.898 | 0.198 0.949 | 0.769 0.936 | 0.556 0.948 | 0.753 0.979 | 0.886 1.00E-04 13k/3k (96)
IMAP (ISCX) 0.994 | 0.843 0.994 | 0.880 0.995 | 0.861 0.9947 | 0.896 0.999 | 0.991 1.00E-06 10k/3k (138)
DNS (ISCX) 0.496 | 0.007 0.821 | 0.590 0.849 | 0.196 0.854 | 0.593 0.857 | 0.593 0.01 40k/10k (73)
SSH (ISCX) 0.131 | 0.834 0.980 | 0.995 0.989 | 0.996 0.989 | 0.998 1 | 1 1.00E-06 2k/10k (7,4k)
SMTP (ISCX) 0.643 | 0.059 0.997 | 0.922 0.991 | 0.688 0.991 | 0.762 0.999 | 0.955 1.00E-06 7k/2k (76)
FTP (ISCX) 0.779 | 0.254 0.998 | 0.945 0.995 | 0.889 0.998 | 0.954 1 | 0.962 1.00E-04 10k/2,5k (226)
ICMP (ISCX) 0.348 | 0.147 0.983 [ 0.787 0.982 | 0.828 0.996 | 0.940 1 | 0.946 1 6k/1.5k (295)
SSH (UNSW) 0.491 | 002 1 | 1 0.998 | 0.310 1 | 0.95 1 | 0.95 1.00E-04 37.5k/95k (19)
FTP (UNSW) 0.505 | 0.270 0.972 | 0.843 0.992 | 0.965 0.993 | 0.964 0.994 | 0.972 1.00E-04 37k/12k (3k)
HTTP (UNSW) 0.509 | 0.369 0.981 | 0.940 0.992 | 0.971 0.992 | 0.974 0.990 | 0.963 1.00E-06 150k/55k (19k)
SMTP (UNSW) 0.5137 | 0.283 1 |1 1 |1 1 |1 1 |1 1.00E-06 61k/20k (5k)
DNS (UNSW) 0.166 | 0.487 1 | 1 1 |1 1 |1 1 |1 0.1 460k/320k (210k)
Mean rank AP 4.39 3.03 3.5 2.33 1.31 - -
Mean rank AUC 4.29 3 3.14 2.11 1.71 - -
results leads to the following observations:
• Point-wise DiFF-RF outperforms almost systematically
the IF algorithm, showing that the blind-spot effect could
play a role (even small) in some applications. The greatest
perforan gap are observed for the DONNUTS, BNA,
CTG MUSK, SPAM, HTTPWeb, HTTPIT and ICMP
datasets.
• Point-wise DiFF-RF achieves better results in average
compared to the deep variational auto-encoder implemen-
tation, although, in some cases such as MiniBooNE or
SPAM, VAE performs significantly better than DiFF-RF.
• In its collective anomaly detection configuration, DiFF-
RF is particularly efficient and outperforms in general
significantly all the other approaches. In some cases, such
as for the MUSK and HTTPIT datasets, it get lower
AUC and AP values than the other methods. One may
notice however, that for these datasets, the detection tasks
is quite difficult, and all the methods performed poorly
(AUC values are near .5).
• Although the datasets are not specifically designed for the
purpose of collective anomaly detection, except maybe
for the intrusion detection data that contains some Deny
of Service (DoS) attacks, the implementation of the
frequency of visit criteria seems to be quite effective to
characterize abnormal co-occurrences of events than can
be, if taken separately, considered as normal.
• On the intrusion detection tasks, the DiFF-RF implemen-
tations are particularly efficient, except for the HTTPIT
dataset. As other methods perform poorly on these data,
one can incriminate the lost of information when en-
coding the payload during the pre-procesing step. The
number of features describing the image data is obviously
inadequate.
• the semi-supervised cross-selection procedure defined and
used to tune the single extra hyper-parameter (α) that is
introduced in DiFF-RF seems to be adequate.
It should be noted here that method DiFF-RF in its col-
lective anomaly configuration has the advantage of having
simultaneous knowledge of all the test data (excepted their
labels).
IV. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the semi-supervised DiFF-RF algorithm
dedicated to anomaly detection. DiFF-RF is an ensemble ap-
proach based on random partitioning trees. It comes with two
configurations depending on whether one considers point-wise
or collective anomalies. From the construction of a synthetic
dataset, thanks to a distance criteria introduced at the leaf
level of the partitioning trees, we have shown that DiFF-RF
solves an apparently quite penalizing drawback observed in the
Isolation Forest algorithm, the so-called ’blind spots’ effect,
that characterize unoccupied areas in the data embedding as
’normal’ areas even if they are far from the ’normal’ data
distribution.
Furthermore, considering frequency of visit at leaf level
DiFF-RF gives this algorithm the ability to cope with col-
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lective anomaly very efficiently while improving in general
the scores obtained by the point-wise configuration.
Extensive testing on UCI datasets and on two benchmarks
dedicated to intrusion detection, shows that DiFF-RF is quite
efficient at detecting point-wise or so-considered collective
anomalies, comparatively to the state of the art methods in
this domain, namely deep variational auto-encoders, Isolation
Forest and One-Class Support Vector Machine. Furthermore,
, similarly to the IF algorithm, DiFF-RF scales well compar-
atively to One-Class SVM and VAE and parallelized imple-
mentations are obviously possible.
Our experimentation shows also that the proposed semi-
supervised cross-selection of the extra hyper-parameter that
is introduced in DiFF-RF algorithm to scale the distance
calculation at leaf level is well suited in practice.
Indeed, more experimentation should be carried out using
datasets dedicated to collective anomaly detection to explore
the limits of the DiFF-RF approach on this task. However,
as it stands, DiFF-RF is a quite competitive semi-supervised
approach for anomaly detection.
Another perspective is to extend DiFF-RF to cope with
categorical data in addition to numerical data. That would
require to implement dedicated similarity or distance measure
for categorical data, while replacing the mean calculation at
leaf level by the selection of a medoid for instance. The fre-
quency of visit at leaf level criteria would remain unchanged.
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